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GST  
AND  
INVOLUNTARY SUPPLIES* 
By Peter Edmundson∗∗ 
This article examines the application of GST to “involuntary 
supplies”. It does this by analysing the compulsory acquisition of land and 
the compulsory acquisition of securities. It is clear that the compulsory 
acquisition of land under statutory mechanisms generally should not 
involve taxable supplies as the dispossessed landholder is passive in the 
process. This highlights a key limitation of the concept of a “supply”. The 
Commissioner recently has acknowledged this treatment despite expressing 
a contrary view for more than two years. The GST treatment of the 
compulsory acquisition of securities is more uncertain. These uncertainties 
largely arise from whether the limitations of the concept of “supply” also 
apply in relation to the definition of “financial supply” in the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the application of the Goods and Services 
Tax (“GST”) to involuntary supplies. Perhaps more accurately it 
explores whether the concept of an “involuntary supply” for GST 
purposes is oxymoronic. It does this by examining compulsory 
acquisitions in two different contexts: 
                                                 
* This article could not have been written without the generous guidance and input 
of Peter McMahon, Partner, Blake Dawson Waldron. The author also is indebted to 
the participants of a Sydney-based GST discussion group for their helpful comments 
on a draft. Any inaccuracies or omissions are the responsibility of the author. 
∗∗ Lecturer, Faculty of Law, UTS and Consultant, Blake Dawson Waldron. 
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• first, the compulsory acquisition of real property 
interests by a government authority; and 
• second, the compulsory acquisition of securities 
pursuant to Ch 6A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
There has been some analysis in the literature of the compulsory 
acquisition of land.1 This has revealed some problems of 
characterisation and some difficult issues concerning the boundaries 
of the concept of a “supply” under the A New Tax System (Goods 
and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (“GST Act”). Discussion in this 
article of the compulsory acquisition of securities reveals some 
further fundamental matters relating to the construction of the GST 
Act and how it interacts with the A New Tax System (Goods and 
Services Tax) Regulations 1999 (“GST Regulations”). 
2. THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND 
Subject to any constitutional limitations,2 a range of government 
authorities have the power compulsorily to acquire real property. 
While such power may flow from an “enabling Act” (in many cases 
the Act that establishes the authority or entity), both the 
Commonwealth and the States have regimes that govern the 
procedures to be followed in the case of compulsory acquisitions of 
land by government authorities. These legislative regimes vary. 
However, they generally provide a process whereby notice is given
                                                 
1 See G Brysland, “GST and Government” (Paper presented to the 2003 National 
GST Intensive, Taxation Institute of Australia, Manly 10-11 October 2003); and 
P Edmundson and P McMahon, “GST and Compulsory Acquisitions” (Sep 2003) 
GST News 1. 
2 The legislative powers of the Commonwealth are restricted by s 51(xxxi) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution which requires any legislatively empowered 
compulsory acquisition to be “on just terms”: see Bank of New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349-350 (per Dixon J). This limitation is a 
creature of the Commonwealth Constitution and does not place limitations on the 
States’ powers to acquire property compulsorily. The States’ powers simply flow 
from principles of parliamentary sovereignty and are without this formal restriction. 
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of the intention to acquire an interest in land and, upon the 
publication of that notice, the relevant interest is: 
(a) vested in the acquiring authority; and 
(b) freed and discharged from all other interests and from all trusts, 
restrictions, dedications, reservations, obligations, mortgages, 
encumbrances, contracts, licences, charges and rates.3 
While the various regimes may provide for an acquisition to be 
by negotiation (presumably by way of transfer),4 where the 
acquisition is compulsory no transfer is required and the process is 
one of vesting and extinguishment. The process of vesting and 
extinguishment gives rise to rights to compensation. However, the 
validity of these measures is not contingent upon compensation 
being paid or accepted by the former land holder.5 
Generally, the regimes provide for the determination of 
compensation based on the market value of the land or interest 
acquired.6 An offer may then be made to the former land holder and 
this may be accepted or rejected (with rights of appeal). In 
circumstances where the adequacy of compensation is disputed there 
may be a right to an interim payment pending the settlement of the 
                                                 
3 Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth), s 41(4). This is in the same form in the Lands 
Acquisition Act 1994 (ACT), s 33(4) and in functionally similar terms in the Land 
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 20(1); the Lands 
Acquisition Act 1978 (NT), s 46(1); the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld), 
s 12(1); the Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA), s 16(2); the Land Acquisition Act 1993 
(Tas), s 19(1); the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic), s 24; and the 
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA), s 179. 
4 See, eg, Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic), s 18. See also Land 
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 30 which allows for the 
curiously-named “compulsory acquisition with consent”. 
5 See, eg, Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth), 45. Indeed, this lack of choice is what 
makes the acquisition compulsory. 
6 See, eg, Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic), s 41(1)(a). The 
provisions dealing with valuation do not allow for an additional amount to be 
payable in respect of GST. If any compensation is to be made in respect of GST it 
would have to be built into the concept of “market value”. For a discussion of this in 
the context of a market value rental review clause, see Orti-Tullo v Sadek [2001] 
NSWSC 855. 
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final amount payable.7 Ultimately, it may be that the amount payable 
is determined by a Court or, alternatively, there may be acceptance 
of an offer in circumstances that require the execution of a release in 
favour of the acquiring authority.8 
While the various jurisdictions’ regimes vary and not all 
possibilities are canvassed, the observer of a compulsory acquisition 
may note the following: 
• a land holder walking away from the land that they 
formerly occupied; 
• a payment being made by an acquirer of that land (either 
by way of settlement, interim payment or court order); 
and 
• the acquirer enjoying the land exclusively. 
3. THE APPLICATION OF GST TO THE 
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND 
When there is a compulsory acquisition of land, an important 
question is whether or not the compulsory acquisition gives rise to a 
taxable supply. It may be that the land holder is not carrying on an 
enterprise or is not required to register for GST.9 However, assuming 
these requirements are satisfied, there can only be a taxable supply if 
there is a “supply for consideration”.10 It is submitted that the
                                                 
7 See, eg, Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 48. 
8 See, eg, Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 44. 
9 See the familiar requirements in s 9-5 of the GST Act. It may also be claimed that 
an event such as a compulsory acquisition is so far outside the ordinary scope of 
business activities that it does not satisfy this requirement. Ultimately this will be a 
question of fact. 
10 GST Act, s 9-5(a). 
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requirement to pay compensation (and the fact that this flows from 
the compulsory acquisition) satisfies the requirement for 
consideration and nexus with any supply that may exist. Therefore, 
the key matter is whether or not there is a supply. 
The term “supply” is defined as “any form of supply 
whatsoever”.11 Without limitation this includes a number of items 
listed in s 9-10(2) of the GST Act. The most relevant of these are: 
• the “grant, assignment or surrender of real property”;12 
• the “creation, grant, transfer assignment or surrender of 
any right”;13 and 
• the “entry into, or release from an obligation ...”.14 
Discussion below first analyses the concept of “supply” in its 
general meaning and then addresses the more specific inclusions set 
out in s 9-10(2). 
3.1 The Compulsory Acquisition of Land Does Not Involve 
a “Supply” in Its General Sense 
The starting point is to examine the concept of “supply” 
generally and then to test whether the context of its use in the 
legislation demands a particular meaning. A dictionary definition of 
“supply” suggests that in its ordinary context it means “to furnish or 
provide”.15 Support for such an interpretation in the context of 
similar provisions can be found in case law overseas.16 The question
                                                 
11 Ibid s 9-10(1). 
12 Ibid s 9-10(2)(d). 
13 Ibid s 9-10(2)(e). 
14 Ibid s 9-10(2)(g). 
15 The Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed). 
16 See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Oliver [1980] 1 All ER 353, 354 (per 
Griffiths J). 
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then becomes whether this encompasses a situation where something 
is done to a particular party, such as the extinguishment of the 
party’s rights, where that party takes no steps to facilitate the 
extinguishment. 
It requires a stretching of the ordinary meaning of “supply” to 
conclude that a party whose rights are extinguished has supplied 
something. It is submitted that the context in which the term is used 
in the GST Act does not demand such a disturbance of the ordinary 
meaning of the word. This is particularly the case when evaluating 
the use of the concept of supply within s 9-5 of the GST Act, the 
“basic rule” dealing with taxable supplies. This basic rule requires a 
party to “make the supply” before any such supply is taxable.17 This 
matter was raised by Underwood J in Shaw v Director of Housing 
and State of Tasmania (No 2),18 a case dealing with the treatment of 
a judgment creditor, the payment to whom extinguishes any rights of 
that creditor to pursue the judgment sum. It was held that there was 
no supply by the creditor in that case as nothing was done by the 
creditor that could amount to a supply.19 Further, even if there is a 
supply, the word “make” in s 9-5 “indicates a legislative intention to 
impose the tax only on voluntary supplies, not upon those supplies 
that occur without an act of the releasor”.20 As is discussed further 
below, whether this reasoning is fundamental to the outcome in 
Shaw, or merely provides ancillary support for the conclusion that 
there is no supply, is a matter that may have consequences elsewhere 
in the GST regime. 
The reasoning in Shaw supports the conclusion that the 
compulsory acquisition of land does not involve a taxable supply by 
the land holder where the land holder is passive and merely has their 
interest extinguished. Such a situation can be distinguished clearly 
                                                 
17 GST Act, s 9-5(a) (emphasis added). 
18 [2001] TASSC 2. 
19 Ibid para 19 (per Underwood J). 
20 Ibid. 
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from a situation where there is a “compelled transfer”.21 
Interestingly, while such a distinction was acknowledged recently by 
the Commissioner in a draft ruling,22 comments on the matter did not 
appear in the final version.23 
When Shaw is analysed closely there is no reasoning that 
compels the conclusion that the ordinary meaning of “supply” should 
extend to the compulsory acquisition of land under the statutory 
mechanisms outlined above. Further, other Australian cases that deal 
with the matter are consistent with the reasoning in Shaw.24 Finally, 
there is nothing in the explanatory materials surrounding the tax that 
demands the stretching of the concept of supply to include such 
compulsory acquisitions.25 Without wading deeply into debate on the 
fundamental nature of the Australian GST, in particular whether it is 
best seen as a tax on consumption,26 it is difficult to see how the 
                                                 
21 See, eg, the facts of FCT v St Hubert’s Island Pty Ltd (1978) 78 ATC 4104 where 
the liquidator of a corporation was effectively compelled by statute to sell some 
land. 
22 See GSTR 2003/D2 in which the Commissioner stated that where a lease is 
terminated under a statutory mechanism “[n]o supply is made by the lessor because 
the lease is terminated pursuant to the exercise of a statutory right by the lessee, and 
not by any act of the lessor” (at para 71). A similar conclusion was reached in a New 
Zealand Departmental Statement dealing with compensation paid to the Maori 
people for the confiscation of land (see New Zealand Departmental Statement, Tax 
Information Bulletin; Vol 4; No 7; released March 1993). 
23 See GSTR 2003/11, in particular para 57 where it is stated that termination of a 
lease under a statutory mechanism is “akin to a term implied by statute” and that the 
GST consequences of such a termination should be the same as the consequences of 
the termination of a lease under an express term in the lease. 
24 See Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 13, paras 
53-55 (per White J); and Walter Construction Group Ltd v Walker Corporation Ltd 
[2001] NSWSC 283, paras 479-481 (per Hunter J). 
25 Resort may be had to such extrinsic materials in order to confirm that the meaning 
of a provision is the ordinary meaning: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB. 
26 It is noted that the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998 repeatedly refers to the tax as being a 
“tax on private consumption in Australia”: (p 5). However, it has been argued 
forcefully that the tax is not on consumption and “so far as the analysis of individual 
transactions is concerned, the connection between the GST and domestic 
consumption is so tenuous that it is meaningless”: G Cooper, “Why GST is Not a 
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treatment of compulsory acquisitions as taxable is required in order 
to give effect to a consumption tax.27 
3.2 The Compulsory Acquisition of Land Does Not Involve 
the Taxable “Surrender” of Land 
It may be argued that the compulsory acquisition of land involves 
the “surrender” of real property and that this amounts to a supply 
pursuant to s 9-10(2)(d) of the GST Act.28 This was the view 
expressed publicly by the Commissioner for more than two years in 
Interpretative Decisions ID 2001/445 and ID 2001/446. In those 
documents it is stated that where an entity’s land is taken by way of 
compulsory acquisition, this involves “the surrendering of the land 
by the entity” and therefore a supply. These Interpretative Decisions 
recently were “overturned” in another decision, ID 2003/1173.29 
While the conclusions drawn in ID 2001/445 and ID 2001/446 
might be justifiable in some circumstances, the Interpretative 
Decisions do not outline what process of compulsory acquisition is 
involved (ie whether the acquisition is by some form of compelled 
transfer or pursuant to a statutory extinguishment of rights). Where a 
compulsory acquisition takes place by way of extinguishment and 
vesting it is difficult to see how there has been a “surrender”. It is 
                                                                                                       
Consumption Tax ... and Why it Matters” (Paper presented to the 2003 National 
GST Intensive, Taxation Institute of Australia, Manly 10-11 October 2003). 
27 Note that Professor Cooper not only asserts that the GST is not a tax on 
consumption but takes the next logical step of stating that it is distracting (or even 
misleading) to interpret the scope of the GST Act from this assumption: ibid. If, as is 
concluded by Professor Cooper, the GST is better seen as a tax on profits the 
question arises whether this should affect the characterisation of compulsory 
acquisitions. Analysis of this matter is left for another day. 
28 Alternatively, it may be argued that it is a surrender of rights pursuant to 
s 9-10(2)(d). 
29 See also ID 2003/1172. These decisions state clearly that there is no supply 
involved. ID 2003/1173 states that an entity “must take some action or do something 
for a supply of the land to occur”. 
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even more difficult to conclude that the initial land holder has made a 
surrender of their proprietary or other rights.30 
The concept of a “surrender” has a familiar meaning in land law. 
A “surrender” typically involves the giving up of an estate in land in 
circumstances where the estate surrendered merges into a greater 
interest. The simplest example is the surrender of a leasehold interest 
by agreement between a lessee and a lessor. If context demands that 
“surrender” is given this legal meaning in s 9-10(2(d) of the GST 
Act, it is clear that no surrender is involved in a compulsory 
acquisition.31 
A broader concept of surrender might involve the abandonment 
of a claim or the relinquishment of a right. It is submitted that even if 
such a broader “ordinary” meaning of the concept is relied upon, the 
fact that a party must make a surrender for there to be a taxable 
supply means that there should be no such taxable surrender where a 
person who is passive has property taken from them. This conclusion 
should not change even if the dispossessed party pursues 
compensation for the loss that they have suffered. On one hand it is 
encouraging that the Commissioner has recognised this in ID 
2003/1173. On the other hand it is disconcerting that it took more 
than two years to settle this matter and during this time the 
Commissioner’s publicly stated view had little basis. 
3.3 Settlement Procedures Should Not Involve a Taxable 
Supply 
The various jurisdictions’ legislation contain differing procedures 
in relation to the finalisation and acceptance of compensation 
amounts. As a precondition to the payment of compensation, a
                                                 
30 Even where the extended meaning of supply in s 9-10(2) is relied upon, for a 
dealing to be taxable the supplier must make the supply (s 9-5(a)). 
31 The clearest support for this conclusion comes from the fact that a surrender as 
described requires the consent of both parties. 
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 number of regimes require the former land holder to execute 
“documents the authority reasonably requires to be executed”.32 The 
New South Wales legislation specifically contemplates the execution 
of a “deed of release and indemnity” in favour of the acquiring 
authority.33 In New South Wales a party might receive a form 
entitled “Acceptance of Offer of Compensation” under which they 
may be asked to acknowledge receipt of an amount: 
... in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims of every nature 
whatever which I now have or may hereafter have for compensation 
in connection with the acquisition of my interest in the land 
described in the Schedule and in consideration of the amount so paid 
as aforesaid I hereby release Her Majesty the Queen the Government 
of the said State and the [relevant authority] and quit claim all claims 
demands actions suits cause and causes of action, or Suit sum or 
sums of money compensation costs charges and expenses which I 
not have or at any time hereafter may have, or but for this writing 
might have against Her said Majesty the Queen the said Government 
or the said [relevant authority] for or on account of the matters 
before specified, or for or on account of any other matter or thing 
caused by or arising out of the same. 
The question then arises whether the execution of such a release 
may give rise to a taxable supply by the releasor. As a reading of 
Public Ruling GSTR 2001/4 indicates, the difficulty in such a case is 
not identifying if there is a supply34 but rather which is the relevant 
supply and whether that supply is sufficiently connected with 
consideration to be treated as taxable. 
In GSTR 2001/4 the Commissioner states that the settlement of a 
claim may give rise to GST consequences where the consideration
                                                 
32 See, eg, the Land Acquisition Act 1993 (Tas), s 45(d) and the Lands Acquisition 
Act 1989 (Cth), s 87(1)(d)(ii). 
33 Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), s 44(2). 
34 It does not require a stretching of the meaning of the words “surrender of a right” 
or “release from an obligation” to conclude that the execution of such a deed of 
release involves the making of a supply. 
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for the settlement relates to an “earlier supply”,35 a “current supply”36 
or a “discontinuance supply”.37 An “earlier supply” is involved 
“where the subject of the dispute is an earlier transaction in which a 
supply was made involving the parties”.38 In the case of a 
compulsory acquisition of land a compensation amount will not 
relate to an earlier underlying supply simply because no earlier 
supply is involved. 
If the terms of a deed of release require a releasor to perform 
some further act, then to the extent to which any consideration is 
provided for this further act (or the promise to perform the act) there 
may be a taxable “current supply”. While the existence of a taxable 
“current supply” will depend upon the terms of any deed of release, 
the form of release applicable in New South Wales does not give rise 
to any obligations that extend beyond the discharge of claims. In this 
case there should not be a taxable “current supply”. 
Finally, while the surrenders flowing from the execution of a 
release involve the making of a supply, such “discontinuance 
supplies” may only be taxable if they are made for consideration.39 In 
the case of a compulsory acquisition, an amount paid by an acquiring 
authority will be purely compensatory in nature and the 
Commissioner suggests that such consideration will not be 
sufficiently connected with a discontinuance supply to make it 
taxable.40 
In GSTR 2001/4 the Commissioner states: 
We consider that a payment made under a settlement deed may have a 
nexus with a discontinuance supply only if there is overwhelming 
                                                 
35 See GSTR 2001/4, paras 45-47. 
36 Ibid paras 48-49. 
37 Ibid paras 50-55. 
38 Ibid para 46. 
39 Ibid para 55. 
40 Ibid para 106. 
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evidence that the claim which is the subject of the dispute is so 
lacking in substance that the payment could only have been made for 
the discontinuance supply.41 
A payment by an acquiring authority clearly is compensatory in 
nature and it would be highly irregular if a government authority 
made such a payment where a dispute over land lacked substance. As 
a result no taxable discontinuance supply should arise. 
In conclusion, the compulsory acquisition of land by a 
government authority should not give rise to a taxable supply. This is 
because the dispossessed party does not perform sufficient acts for it 
to be concluded that they have made a supply. While any release that 
may be given as part of the process needs to be considered 
individually, an appropriately drafted release that deals only with the 
compulsory acquisition should not involve a taxable supply. 
4. THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF 
SECURITIES 
Discussion above reveals an important limitation of the concept 
of a taxable supply under the GST Act: that there must be some form 
of positive act in order for there to be a supply. By examining 
another form of involuntary disposition, the compulsory acquisition 
of shares, it is hoped to shed some light on whether this limitation 
arises elsewhere in the GST regime. 
Chapter 6A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides for the 
compulsory acquisition of securities in a range of circumstances. 
This may be following a takeover bid42 or in some circumstances 
where a person holds 90% of the relevant class of securities.43 The 
relevant regimes provide both definition of the circumstances in 
which there may be a compulsory acquisition and the procedures to
                                                 
41 Ibid para 109. 
42 See generally Pt 6A.1 of the Corporations Act. 
43 See generally Pt 6A.2 of the Corporations Act. 
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be followed to complete a compulsory acquisition.44 The regime 
provides for the payment of compensation to the holders of securities 
that are acquired compulsorily.45 Section 666B provides a statutory 
procedure for the completion of a compulsory acquisition in the 
following terms: 
(1) Under this section, the person acquiring the securities must: 
(a) give the company that issued the securities a copy of the 
compulsory acquisition notice under section 661B or 664C together 
with a transfer of the securities: 
(i) signed as transferor by someone appointed by the person 
acquiring the securities; and 
(ii) signed as transferee by the person acquiring the securities; and 
(b) pay, issue or transfer the consideration for the transfer to the 
company that issued the securities. 
The person appointed under subparagraph (a)(i) has authority to sign the 
transfer on behalf of the holder of the securities. 
(2) If the person acquiring the securities complies with subsection 
(1), the company that issued the securities must: 
(a) register the person as the holder of the securities; and 
(b) hold the consideration received under subsection (1) in trust for the 
person who held the securities immediately before registration; and 
                                                 
44 See generally Pt 6A.3 of the Corporations Act. 
45 See also s 1350, where an attempt is made to safeguard the constitutional validity 
of any measure in the Corporations Act providing for compulsory acquisition by 
inserting a general power to claim reasonable compensation. This supplements any 
rights under Ch 6A. Of course, a provision such as s 1350 is particularly pertinent 
following the referral by the States to the Commonwealth of power in relation to 
incorporation. 
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(c) give written notice to the person referred to in paragraph (b) as 
soon as practicable that the consideration has been received and is 
being held by the company pending their instructions as to how it is 
to be dealt with. 
(3) If the consideration held under subsection (2) consists of, or 
includes, money, that money must be paid into a bank account 
opened and maintained for that purpose only”.46 
This process is very different from those under the various 
provisions dealing with the compulsory acquisition of land by 
government authorities. It is not a process of extinguishment and 
vesting, but rather one of compulsory transfer. The most unique 
aspect of the process is that a transfer takes place without any action 
by the transferor. 
5. THE APPLICATION OF GST TO THE 
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF SECURITIES 
Subject to the requirements in reg 40-5.09, the provision, 
acquisition or disposal of an interest in or under a security is a 
financial supply47 and therefore input taxed.48 Therefore, in many 
circumstances, both the transferor and transferee of a share will be 
treated as making an input taxed supply. The question is whether this 
is also the case in relation to the procedures under s 666B of the 
Corporations Act. This matter raises both important conceptual 
issues and practical issues. 
While transfers of securities pursuant to s 666B will not be 
taxable supplies, if it can be argued that the dealing is outside the 
scope of GST, this opens the possibility of claiming input tax credits 
in respect of the costs of acquisitions relating to the dealings (both
                                                 
46 Emphasis added. 
47 See reg 40-5.09(3) item 10 of the GST Regulations. 
48 GST Act, s 40-5(1). 
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from the perspective of the transferor and the transferee).49 The fact 
that recently there has been significant litigation in relation to such 
acquisitions suggests that these costs may be considerable.50 Experts’ 
reports may be required as part of the process51 and the matter is 
particularly acute for acquirers under the process as they may be 
forced to bear the costs of the holder of the security that is 
acquired.52 
5.1 Does Regulation 40-5.09 Require a Positive Act? 
The application of GST to acquisitions under s 666B raises some 
difficult conceptual matters. First, if it is accepted that there is no 
taxable supply where there is not a positive act by the putative 
supplier, does this limitation also apply in relation to financial 
supplies? This raises the difficult relationship between supplies and 
financial supplies. 
The concept of a “supply”, as defined in the GST Act, includes a 
financial supply.53 However, what is a “financial supply” is defined 
in the GST Regulations.54 If it is concluded that the concept of a 
supply in the GST Act brings with it an inherent limitation, this calls 
into question the validity of provisions in the GST Regulations that 
purport to stretch beyond this limitation. This possibility of 
                                                 
49 If the dealing is input taxed, while neither party will be required to remit GST, the 
combined effect of s 11-5 and 11-15 of the GST Act may operate to deny full input 
tax credits in respect of anything acquired in relation to the making of the input 
taxed supply. There is the possibility of receiving a 75% credit if the relevant 
acquisition is a “reduced credit acquisition”: GST Act, s 70-5. 
50 See, eg, Pauls Ltd v Dwyer (2001) 19 ACLC 959; Kelly-Springfield Australia Pty 
Ltd v Green & Ors [2002] NSWSC 53; Capricorn Investments Pty Ltd v Catto & 
Ors [2002] VSC 105. 
51 See Pt 6A.4 of the Corporations Act. 
52 Section 664F(4) of the Corporations Act. As an aside, where one party must “bear 
the costs” of another party, careless characterisation may give rise to the situation 
where neither party is entitled to a credit: GST Act, s 11-5. 
53 GST Act, s 9-10(2)(f). 
54 See generally Sub-div 40-A of the GST Regulations. 
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repugnancy is an inherent danger in defining in delegated legislation 
a concept as fundamental as “financial supply”.55 
The definition of a financial supply also seems to suggest that a 
“supply” is required,56 adding an element of circularity to the issue. 
Question, then, whether reg 40-5.09 should be read to include the 
limitation that there is no financial supply unless something is done 
by the supplier. There are arguments both for and against such a 
proposition. 
One argument against reading a limitation into reg 40-5.09 is that 
while some form of act is required for there to be a taxable supply, 
this limitation does not derive from the concept of a supply as 
defined in s 9-10 but rather the fact that s 9-5 requires a person to 
“make the supply”.57 In Shaw, Underwood J refers to the word 
“make” in s 9-5 and appears to use this to assist in the 
characterisation of the word supply in s 9-10.58 The reasoning in that 
case appears to be that the passivity of the party leads to the 
conclusion that there is no supply (and therefore no taxable supply). 
It does not appear to state that there is a supply but that supply is not 
taxable because a party did not make the supply. It is submitted that 
the better view is that the limitation arises in the concept of “supply” 
itself, and not only in the context of determining what is a taxable 
supply. 
Another argument against reading a limitation into reg 40-5.09 is 
that the provision (when read with reg 40-5.06) specifically 
contemplates that an acquirer can be treated as making a financial 
supply. This may be used to distinguish the cases (both in Australia
                                                 
55 This issue has long been recognised: see P McMahon and A MacIntyre, GST and 
the Financial Markets (2001) 3. 
56 This is not explicit, but reg 40-5.09(1) refers variously to the “supplier” of a 
financial supply and the “supply of the interest”. See also the discussion in 
McMahon and MacIntyre, above n 55, 40. 
57 GST Act, s 9-5(a) (emphasis added). 
58 [2001] TASSC 2, para 19. 
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and overseas) that consider limitations on the concept of supply. 
These cases do not contemplate the statutory fiction of an acquirer as 
a supplier. Perhaps it is open to the Courts to take a different view of 
the meaning of the word “supply” in the unique context of reg 40-
5.09. 
Conversely, it may be argued that reg 40-5.09 does require some 
form of positive act by a putative supplier simply on the basis that 
the scheme set up by the legislation brings with it an overriding 
limitation that the tax does not attach to involuntary dealings and it 
would be perverse if subordinate legislation purported to have this 
effect. This argument gains some support from an examination of the 
structure of the legislative scheme. Section 5-5 describes the 
relationship between supplies that are taxable and those that are 
“exempt”59 because of the operation of provisions in Ch 3 of the 
GST Act. It is stated that the “exemptions” in Ch 3 (which include 
provisions that operate to classify supplies as input taxed) “exempt 
from the GST what would otherwise be taxable”. This suggests that 
one should first establish that a supply potentially is taxable under s 
9-5 and then, as a second step, consider whether it is a financial 
supply. If this approach is accepted s 9-5 acts as an initial “filter” and 
any limitation in s 9-5 effectively will operate in relation to the 
“exemptions”. 
It may also be argued that, regardless of any limitation inherent 
in the concepts of “supply” and “taxable supply”, the concepts of 
“provision”, “acquisition” or “disposal” relied upon in reg 40-9.05 
themselves require some form of positive act. For example, it might 
be argued that there must be a positive act for there to be a disposal 
as defined in reg 40-5.04. A problem with this argument is that the 
concept of a “disposal” specifically includes a “transfer”60 
and s 666B of the Corporations Act clearly provides for the 
“transfer” of
                                                 
59 Care must be taken with the use of the word “exempt” in this context. In many 
jurisdictions the term “exempt” is used as the equivalent of “input taxed”. 
60 Regulation 40-5.04. 
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the relevant securities. Whether the concept of “transfer” in reg 40-
5.03 extends to the type of transfer contemplated in s 666B is another 
matter. A starting point for the consideration of this issue might be 
the stamp duty cases dealing with the definition of “transfer”. These 
cases generally refer to the passing of pre-existing property from one 
party to another.61 A transfer under s 666B appears to fall within this 
concept. This leaves it open to conclude that there is a transfer 
regardless of the fact that the transferor is not involved in the 
process. 
In conclusion, the matter is not clear, but perhaps the better view 
is that the structure of the legislative scheme and limitations inherent 
in the concept of supply suggest that some form of positive act is 
required before a party can be treated as making a financial supply. 
While this conclusion is tentative, discussion below addresses the 
consequences that might flow in the context of the compulsory 
acquisition of securities. 
5.2 Complications in the Characterisation of the 
Compulsory Acquisition of Securities 
If it is decided that the making of a financial supply requires 
some form of positive act, then a few questions remain: 
• does this limitation apply to both “acquisition financial 
supplies” and “ordinary financial supplies”?; and 
• is it correct to state that there has been a positive act by 
the holder of the acquired securities in the taking up of 
the securities? 
In relation to the first of these questions, it is submitted that it 
would be a curious result if a dealing did not give rise to a financial
                                                 
61 See Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127; and Coles Myer 
Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) 97 ATC 4110. 
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supply by a party making a provision or disposal (because of the lack 
of a positive act) but did give rise to a financial supply by the 
acquirer. Further, if the view is taken that reg 40-5.09 contains an 
overriding limitation, then this limitation should apply to provisions, 
acquisitions and disposals. 
In relation to the second of these questions, it may be argued that 
the situation is analogous to that outlined in GSTR 2003/11. That 
ruling considers the termination of a lease pursuant to consumer 
credit legislation. The ruling states that this statutory right to 
terminate “forms part of the framework” of relevant leases “whether 
or not it is referred to expressly in the lease”.62 Further, it is stated 
that: 
the statutory right to terminate early is therefore akin to a term 
implied by statute. It follows that the GST implication of early 
termination pursuant to the statutory right are similar to those arising 
out of early termination in accordance with an express term of the 
original lease.63 
This reasoning replaces a statement in draft ruling GSTR 
2003/D2 that in such a situation “no supply is made by the lessor 
because the lease is terminated pursuant to the exercise of a statutory 
right by the lessee, and not by any act of the lessor”.64 It is submitted 
that in relation to s 666B the reasoning in GSTR 2003/D2 is more 
appropriate than that in GSTR 2003/11. It is difficult to characterise 
the procedures under Ch 6A of the Corporations Act as terms 
inserted into a bargain. The Corporations Act contemplates that some 
sections “have effect as a contract ... between a member and each 
other member”65 but this is limited to the replaceable rules.66 On this
                                                 
62 GSTR 2003/11, para 56. 
63 Ibid para 57. 
64 GSTR 2003/D2 (replaced by GSTR 2003/11 on 3 September 2003). 
65 Section 140. 
66 See s 141 for a list of such replaceable rules and s 135 for a description of their 
nature. 
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basis it is submitted that the better view is that the taking up of shares 
subject to the regime in Ch 6A should not be seen as a positive act 
sufficient to make the compulsory acquisition of those shares a 
supply. 
Again, the conclusion is guarded, but the better view is that a 
compulsory acquisition of securities pursuant to s 666B of the 
Corporations Act should not give rise to an input taxed financial 
supply by the transferor. Instead the dealing should be outside the 
scope of the GST because the transferor does not perform any 
positive act that results in the transfer of the securities. It is slightly 
harder to reach the conclusion that the transferee does not make a 
financial supply, but this is still arguable. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The consideration of compulsory acquisitions highlights some 
important potential limitations of the concept of a supply. The 
position in the context of the compulsory acquisition of land by a 
government authority is fairly clear and the Commissioner has 
recently retreated from the long-held position that taxable supplies 
are made. However, the matter is not as clear in the context of the 
compulsory acquisition of shares. Both scenarios raise matters that 
are more fundamental than simple issues of characterisation of 
dealings. 
Analysis of the compulsory acquisition of land reveals an 
important limitation to the concept of “taxable supply”. That is the 
supplier must do something that amounts to the making of a supply 
and the extinguishment of the rights of a passive party should not be 
treated as taxable. Analysis of the compulsory acquisition of 
securities reveals the potential for a similar limitation in the context 
of financial supplies. However, the existence and scope of any such 
limitation is less certain. In part this uncertainty flows from the 
structure of the Australian GST regime and, in particular, 
complexities in the relationship between the GST Act and the GST 
Regulations. It has long been recognised that the placement in 
regulations of such an important matter as the definition of financial 
supply has the potential to cause uncertainty. This article has aimed 
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to draw to the surface some of these uncertainties and take some 
small steps towards their resolution. 
 
